Youngzhao Liu v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-13-2011 
Youngzhao Liu v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Youngzhao Liu v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1242. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1242 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3705 
 ___________ 
 
 YONGZHAO LIU, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
    Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A95 872 608) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 2, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 13, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Yongzhao Liu seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
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(“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.1
 Liu is citizen of China who arrived in the United States in 2002.  Shortly 
thereafter, he filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  He alleged that his wife 
underwent two forced abortions and that he left China because he feared that he would be 
sterilized for violating the country’s one-child policy.  In 2004, an Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) denied the application, concluding that Liu had not met his burden of proof.  The 
BIA affirmed without opinion, and we denied Liu’s petition for review.  Liu v. Att’y 
Gen., C.A. No. 06-1958, 236 F. App’x 744 (3d Cir. June 11, 2007). 
  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition for review.   
 In August 2007, Liu filed a motion to reopen, claiming that his attorney provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel and asserting that country conditions in China had 
changed.  The BIA denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely and that Liu had 
not satisfied the requirements stated in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 
1988), for presenting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Liu filed a petition for 
review, which we denied in part and granted in part.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., C.A. No. 07-
4798, 296 F. Appx. 253 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2008).  In particular, we held that the motion to 
reopen was untimely, that Liu was not entitled to equitable tolling, and that he did not 
make any effort to comply with any of the procedural requirements stated in Lozada.  But 
                                                 
1 Throughout the immigration proceedings, the petitioner’s name has also 
appeared as “Yong Zhao,” “Youngzhao,” and “Yougzhao.” 
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because there was no indication that the BIA had considered whether Liu satisfied the 
conditions for reopening based on changed country conditions, we remanded the matter 
to the BIA.  Liu, 296 F. Appx. 253, at 256.  On remand, the Board held that Liu’s 
evidence was insufficient to establish a change in country conditions so as to create an 
exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.  Liu did not file a petition 
for review of the Board’s decision. 
 Liu filed a second motion to reopen in January 2010, seeking to submit a 
“successive asylum application . . . because of changed country conditions and changed 
personal circumstances.”  This time Liu alleged that he feared persecution based on his 
participation in pro-democracy political groups in the United States, such as the China 
Democracy Party (“CDP”) and the Federation for a Democratic Party (“FDC”).  He also 
claimed that Chinese authorities visited his wife and warned her that Liu had to stop his 
political activities.  Liu further asserted that “[c]onditions in China have changed greatly 
regarding the ability to propagate any ideas dissenting from the official one-party line on 
the Internet or traditional media since [he] was denied asylum.”  To support the allegedly 
changed country conditions, Liu submitted State Department reports, news articles 
describing CDP members who had been arrested upon their return to China, and an 
affidavit from a friend in China surmising that Liu will be persecuted if he returns 
because of the government’s increased suppression of political dissent.     
 On August 18, 2010, the BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that it was 
time- and number-barred and that Liu did not qualify for the exception from those 
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requirements based on changed circumstances arising in China.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  The Board concluded that Liu’s involvement in pro-democracy 
organizations constituted a change in personal circumstances and not changed country 
conditions, that he failed to establish that the Chinese government was aware of his 
political activities in the United States, and that he had not demonstrated a relevant 
change in country conditions based on China’s treatment of returnees who participated in 
pro-democracy activities.  Liu filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision.    
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242 
[8 U.S.C. § 1252].  We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.  
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under this standard, we may reverse 
the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. 
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  An alien generally may file only one motion 
to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on 
which the final administrative decision was rendered.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The 
time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed 
country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and 
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  The term “previous hearing” in 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers to the proceedings before the IJ.  Filja, 447 F.3d at 252. 
 Liu does not dispute that the BIA correctly determined that the motion to reopen 
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was untimely and number-barred.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  In addition, the BIA 
correctly held that Liu’s alleged membership in pro-democracy political groups in the 
United States is a change in his personal circumstance, not a change in country conditions 
that would support reopening.  See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir. 
2009); see also Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
“membership and participation in the CDP and its activities in the United States . . . 
demonstrated a change in [Petitioner’s] personal circumstances but did not demonstrate 
changed country conditions in China.”).  Liu maintains, however, that the BIA “abused 
its discretion because it did not explicitly consider all of the evidence of changed country 
conditions.”  We disagree. 
 The BIA is required to “actually consider the evidence and argument that a party 
presents.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.2001)).  Indeed, “the BIA abuses its discretion if it 
fails completely to address evidence of changed country circumstances offered by a 
petitioner.”  Id. at 268 (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Here, 
the Board specifically identified the evidence that Liu submitted in support of his claim, 
including evidence of changed country conditions that “materially bears on his claim.”  
Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2005).  In particular, the BIA noted 
Liu’s submission of “various county reports that address the government’s crackdown on 
political opponents in China,” the statement from Liu’s friend describing “more and more 
severe” government suppression, and other “evidence of county conditions in China,” 
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which included news articles about the arrests of two CDP members.  After considering 
this evidence, the Board held that Liu had not demonstrated a relevant change in country 
conditions in China.  Under the circumstances, we conclude that the BIA adequately 
considered the materials submitted by Liu in support of his claim of changed 
circumstances. 
 We also agree that Liu’s evidence did not establish changed country conditions in 
China sufficient to warrant reopening.  Liu’s changed country conditions argument relied 
primarily on excerpts from State Department Country Reports, which described 
harassment, detention, and imprisonment of those perceived to be a threat to the Chinese 
government.  Those Reports, however, do not demonstrate a material change in the 
treatment of members of pro-democracy political groups since the 2004 proceedings 
before the IJ.  For instance, the 2007 Report states that individuals “who participate in 
high-profile pro-democracy activities in the United States still run the risk of arrest and 
imprisonment should they return to China.”  (emphasis added).  Notably, the 2004 State 
Department Profile of Asylum Claims, which was submitted in connection with Liu’s 
initial asylum proceedings, indicates that political dissenters generally, and CDP 
members specifically, faced repression by the Chinese government.  Although Liu quotes 
portions of the more recent State Department reports that refer to “increased” harassment, 
detention, and censorship, those alleged changes pertain generally to the treatment of the 
press and those perceived as threats to government authority, not to members of pro-
democracy groups specifically. 
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 Liu also relied on affidavits from his nephew and a friend which suggested that 
Liu would face persecution in China based on his political activism.   Liu’s nephew 
claimed that Chinese authorities “asked [Liu’s wife] to inform [him] to quit the FDC . .  . 
immediately” and “threatened . . . that if [Liu] returned, he must report to the . . . [p]olice 
[s]tation . . . and accept investigation and punishment.”  Liu’s friend claimed that because 
“in recent years the Chinese government’s suppression on democratic movements 
became more and more severe,” Liu “will definitely be persecuted” if he returns to China.  
These affidavits provide, at most, anecdotal evidence of China’s long-standing policy of 
prohibiting political dissent.  Accordingly, we agree that the affidavits do not sufficiently 
demonstrate a change in country conditions.2
 In sum, because the BIA properly concluded that Liu did not satisfy the exception 
to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen based changed country conditions, we 
will deny the petition for review. 
      
 
  
                                                 
2 Because Liu failed to establish that reopening was warranted, we reject any 
assertion that he is entitled to file a successive asylum application pursuant to INA 
§ 208(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D)] or to pursue relief under the CAT.  Liu, 555 
F.3d at 150 (explaining that “8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows successive asylum 
applications only within the 90-day reopening period for orders denying asylum unless 
the alien can show changed country conditions on the required accompanying motion to 
reopen.”).  
